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6 The conception of the socially embedded 
individual 
John B. Davis 
Social economics differs in many respects from standard mainstream eco-
nomics, but one of the most fundamental differences is that it employs a 
conception of the human individual as socially embedded rather than as 
atomistic. Indeed, just as the atomistic individual conception is one of the 
defining characteristics of mainstream economics, so the socially embed-
ded individual conception is one of the defining characteristics of social 
economics. Broadly speaking, the difference between these two conceptions 
rests on whether individuals and their behavior are explained 'externally' in 
terms of their social relationships or 'internally' in terms of their private 
tastes and preferences. The former perspective sees sociallife as intrinsic to 
our understanding of individuals as social beings; the latter perspective 
operates with a view of social life restricted to the market interaction of 
individuals understood as non-social beings. It follows that these two con-
ceptions of the individual also support two different normative visions of 
individuals and society. The socially embedded individual conception is 
associated with normative principies that emphasize relationships between 
people, such as equality, fairness and the (positive) freedom to achieve, 
whereas the atomistic individual conception is associated with normative 
principies that emphasize the independence of individuals, such as auton-
omy, rights and (negative) freedom from social interference. We can char-
acterize the former approach as a social justice view and the latter approach 
as a liberal society view. Each has strongly contrasting social economic 
policy recommendations associated with it, particularly with respect to the 
role given to the market in modern economies, and indeed much of modern 
history can be explained in terms of conflicting horizons laid out by these 
two views. 
This chapter is devoted to explaining the socially embedded individual 
conception. Given that there are many ways in which social relationships 
can be discussed, there are also many ways in which individuals can be 
understood to be socially embedded. The first section of the chapter 
accordingly surveys a variety of recent contributions to this understanding, 
giving attention both to those that explicitly develop socially embedded 
individual conceptions and also to those that do so more indirectly by 
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criticizing the standard atomistic individual conception. The second and 
third sections then discuss two fundamental issues raised by these contri-
butions: (a) the relation of social identity to personal identity, and (b) the 
problem of inequality. The fourth section el oses the chapter with comments 
on how thinking about individuals in economics may evolve in the future. 
l. Recent contributions to the conception of the socially embedded 
individual 
An important challenge to the conception of the socially embedded indi-
vidual is to explain how individuals can still be individual when socially 
embedded. There has been a long debate in economics between proponents 
of methodological individualism - the idea that economic explanations 
should take individuals as entry points - and proponents of methodologi-
cal holism - the idea that economic explanations should take social aggre-
gates (such as classes, social groups etc.) as entry points. Critics of the 
atomistic individual conception who also reject methodological individu-
alism thus often also adopt methodological holism as their perspective, and 
accordingly sometimes find themselves treating 'socially embedded indi-
vidual' as an oxymoron. Their reasoning is that as social structures are 
primary, they must be determinative of individual behavior (just as 
methodological individualists argue that as individuals are primary, they 
must be determinative of social structures). But both perspectives are too 
narrow since it can be argued that social structures influence individuals 
and that individuals also influence social structures, and thus that each con-
stitute independent agents. On this wider view, then, 'socially embedded 
individual' is a meaningful conception whose understanding requires the 
analysis of both types of influences. 
This has been done by many in connection with a cross-disciplinary 
social science and philosophy investigation termed structure- agency 
theory, whose premise is that individuals and societies both need to be 
explained in terms of their mutual influences u pon one another. Sociologist 
Mar k Granovetter stated this in an especially influential way in arguing that 
socially embedded individuals are neither 'atoms outside a social context' 
nor beings who 'adhere slavishly toa script written for them by the partic-
ular intersection of social categories they happen to occupy' (Granovetter, 
1985, p. 487). Sociologist Anthony Giddens advanced one particular view 
of structure- agent interactions he termed 'structuration theory', which 
treats individuals and social structures as interdependent and insep-
arable or as a duality of structure (Giddens, 1976). Economist Tony 
Lawson argues that 'social structure [is] dependent upon human agency ... 
open to transformation through changing human practices' (Lawson, 1997, 
p. 158). 
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But how is it, we should ask, that individuals are indeed agents when 
social structures are said to affect them? Put differently, how can we invest 
individuals with a relative autonomy when we recognize they are acted 
upon by society? The answer lies in deepening the concept of the individ-
ual as an agent to include the idea of being a reflexive being. A long history 
of social psychology (cf. Davis, 2003, pp. 114fT.) treats individuals as 
reflexive beings in virtue of their ability to form self-concepts and engage 
in different kinds of self-referring behavior. Of course social factors 
influence how individuals form self-concepts, but the idea that they are able 
to reflexively take themselves as subjects as objects of their thinking and 
activity, or objectify themselves as subjects, implies that individuals can 
detach themselves in sorne degree from the determining effects of social 
factors influencing them. This relative detachment allows us to suppose 
that individuals also influence social structures, just as social structures 
influence individuals, and enables us to then treat the idea of the individual 
being socially embedded as a coherent and meaningful conception. 
We can accordingly first distinguish explicit contributions to the socially 
embedded individual conception as those that employ sorne sort of struc-
ture-agent modeling of individual and society and which characterize 
individuals in sorne fashion as reflexive beings. Six different types of con-
tributions fall within this description: social economic, institutionalist, crit-
ica! realist, feminist, intersubjectivist and expressivist. 
The social economic conception of the socially embedded individual is 
often referred toas Hamo socio-economicus (O'Boyle, 1994). As Mark Lutz 
puts it, 'persons as social individuals are embedded in a web of constitutive 
social relations' (Lutz, 1999, p. 6) such as community, family, anda variety 
of wider social relationships, all of which support different sets of social 
values that individuals rely upon to guide their daily lives. Economic rela-
tionships, such as consumption, production and exchange, then, are framed 
by these constitutive social relations, so that social values always underlie 
economic values. Lutz accordingly explains the individual as a dual self in 
that individuals possess first-order preferences over goods and work and 
also second-order or social value preferences over these first-order prefer-
ences. David George uses this framework to argue that pro-market policies 
often promote first-order preferences at the expense of second-order ones, 
as for example when individuals are encouraged to consume products they 
believe they should avoid (George, 2001). Amartya Sen brings out the 
reflexivity inherent in this dual self-conception of the individual when he 
characterizes individuals as beings able to engage in rational self-scrutiny 
(Sen, 2002). One way in which individuals can be seen to exercise rational 
self-scrutiny in their interaction with others is captured by collective 
intentionality theory. When individuals express intentions using the 'we' 
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pronoun, they need to ask themselves whether those to whom the 'we' 
applies would agree with what they express (Davis, 2003, ch. 7). In such set-
tings, individuals are both influenced by social relationships and social 
structures, and influence them as well, with the latter depending upon their 
ability to place themselves in social contexts. 
Thinking about the individual in institutionalist economics goes back to 
Charles Cooley's 'looking-glass self' that makes how individuals judge 
themselves a matter of how they believe they appear to others (Cooley, 
1902, pp. 179ff.). George Mead's symbolic interactionism later expanded 
this view to include the idea that the mind and self are products of social 
processes (Mead, 1934), so that self-reflection is embedded in social life. 
Institutionalism originates in the evolutionary views of Thorstein Veblen 
and the idea that social processes evolve. In a structure- agent framework, 
the evolution of the economy as a social economic process involves 'both 
the dependence of institutions upon individuals and the molding of indi-
viduals by institutions' - both 'upward and downward causation' processes 
(Hodgson, 2000, p. 326). Upward causation, which occurs when individ-
uals influence and create institutions, depends upon learning seen as a 
recursive social practice. Individuals develop habits around social rules and 
customs in their social environment, but modify those habits as they adjust 
them to their own circumstances. At the same time, individuals not only 
rely on social rules and customs and tailor them to their own cases, but they 
also do this as social rules and customs themselves evolve in response to the 
actions of individuals (Dolfsma, 2002). The institutionalist learning-based 
view of individuals, then, treats individuals as socially embedded, reflexive 
beings constantly adjusting to their own changing circumstances in a his-
torical process that is itself dynamic. 
Tony Lawson develops a critica! realist understanding of the structure-
agent model that makes 'social structure dependent upon human agency 
... open to transformation through changing human practices which in 
turn can be affected by criticising the conceptions and understandings on 
which people act' (Lawson, 1997, p. 158). Social structure changes because 
human practices change as a result of individuals' reflection u pon them and 
their place within them. Lawson characterizes the rationality of individu-
als thus understood as a 'situated rationality' in which individuals occupy 
social positions structured by rules, obligations and the powers that accom-
pany them, and act within this social space. Much of this activity is rou-
tinized and relies on tacit knowledge and skills that individuals exercise 
unconsciously. Yet that this activity can beco me conscious means that it can 
still be seen as intentional. The overall structure- agent model that Lawson 
employs, then, is one in which social structures and human agency co-
evolve in social processes that reproduce and transform them both. 
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Individuals are refiexive beings, but the basis on which they are is continu-
ally changing. This arguably produces a need in individuals for an 'inner 
security' in the form of 'a significant degree of continuity, stability and 
sameness in daily affairs' (ibid., p. 180). Put in terms of the concept of the 
individual, socially embedded individuals exhibit a need for an 'ontologi-
cal security' that preserves their status as individual agents in a social world 
that is constantly changing. 
Feminist economists emphasize the social construction of individuallife 
in terms of such social identities as gender, race or ethnicity, nationality, 
etc. As Nancy Folbre puts it, 'individuals are so embedded in a complex 
structure of individual and collective identities and competing interpret-
ations of these that sometimes they do not even know whose interests they 
are acting on' (Folbre, 1994, p. 16). For example, women have quite 
different social identities associated with work and family, and often find 
their responsibilities to each domain in confiict. This shows, however, that 
individuals cannot be reduced to their social identities, since they must 
determine how they organize and negotiate these different domains. In this 
regard, they are refiexive beings who evaluate how they believe they fit into 
the social relationships they occupy. At the same time, how many individ-
uals together respond to their many social relationships in turn infiuences 
the development of social structures themselves. One manifestation of this 
is social economic policy designed to improve the capacity of women to 
operate in multiple domains, such as legislation aimed at discriminatory 
practices in the workplace that penalize women for household caring 
responsibilities. Thus feminists also employ a socially embedded indivi-
dual conception, and treat individuals and social structures as mutually 
infiuencing. 
Two additional conceptions of individuals as socially embedded are 
intersubjectivist economics ( or French conventions theory) and the expres-
sivist individual view. Intersubjectivist economics (Dupuy, 1989; Orlean, 
1992; Thévenot, 1989) draws on the phenomenon of speculation in 
financia! markets to argue that 'what we think, desire and decide as eco-
nomic actors depends a great deal on what other actors are seen to think, 
desire, and decide' (Fullbrook, 2002, p. 2). Individuals thus explained 
exhibit strategic rationality, whereby they take into account whether others 
will cooperate or compete, and also a communicational rationality, 
whereby they make shared commitments to various norms and social 
conventions. The expressivist individual view is developed by Shaun 
Hargreaves Heap (2001), who focuses on individuals' refiective capacities 
and sense of self-worth, and Philippe Fontaine (1997), who focuses on the 
differences and relationships between individuals' sympathetic and 
empathic identification with others. Both views are influenced by Adam 
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Smith's 'impartía! spectator' perspective that individuals can adopt to judge 
their relations to others (Smith, 1976 [1759]). 
In addition to these six socially embedded individual conceptions, there 
exist contributions to thinking about the individual in economics in recent 
mainstream economics that make more indirect contributions to thinking 
about individuals as socially embedded. Two are discussed here. Behavioral 
economics, whose origins lie in psychology, and complexity economics, 
whose sources are physics and biology, both make cases for seeing individ-
uals as socially embedded by criticizing different aspects of the standard 
atomistic individual conception. 
Behavioral economics emphasizes the need to replace the standard view 
of the individual as Romo economicus by a more realistic conception of the 
individual as Romo sapiens. Whereas the former is a hyperrational being, 
for the latter ' the degree of rationality bestowed to the agents depends on 
the context being studied' (Thaler, 2000, p. 134). Of course 'context' can 
mean many things, and indeed in much of behavioral economics research 
it is treated as a relatively abstract principie. For example, contrary to the 
standard view of choice, behavioralists argue that individual decision-
making exhibits framing effects and reference-dependence reflecting the 
anchoring of choice in particular circumstances (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1991). But many of the applications of these concepts give the principie of 
context important social content. Thus framing effects and the reference-
dependence of choice have been shown to produce hyperbolic time 
discounting, which implies that people tend to ignore the future. 
Behavioralists have accordingly recommended social economic policies 
that correct for this bias (e.g. Madrian and Shea, 2001), thus translating an 
abstract principie of context into a social one. Context, then, socially 
embeds individuals, and the atomistic individual conception that ignores 
context fails to represent individuals adequately. 
Complexity economics investigates economic systems that exhibit non-
linear dynamics, and uses an approach termed agent-based modeling to 
represent individuals in such systems (Tesfatsion, 2006). In contrast to 
standard economics with its single conception of the individual as an 
abstract atomistic being, complexity economics assumes agents or individ-
uals are interactive and heterogeneous, and then explains the non-linear 
dynamics of different economic systems in terms of the co-evolution of 
different kinds of agents' expectations of each other and the systems they 
jointly occupy. For example, Alan Kirman's fish market model distin-
guishes buyers who tend to be loyal to certain sellers from buyers who regu-
larly visit many different sellers, and then investigates how one particular 
fish market (in Marseille, France) evolves patterns of prices and distribu-
tion that reflects specific social-historical circumstances (Kirman, 2001). 
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Another example is the Santa Fe stock market model (cf. Arthur, 1995), 
which looks at different populations of agents, and traces the movement of 
asset values that results from their interaction over time. As do the behav-
ioralists, complexity theorists fault the atomistic individual conception as 
a key obstacle to more realistic explanations of economies, and although 
they do not base their arguments directly on a conception of the individual 
as socially embedded (as do the six approaches discussed above ), they end 
up making a case for just such a conception. 
All eight of the approaches discussed here, then, reject the dichotomy 
between methodological individualism and methodological holism, and 
employ sorne kind of structure-agent analysis in which causal influences 
operate in two directions. The section that follows addresses two sets of 
issues that arise in this framework. 
2. Social identity and personal identity 
One particularly important problem that the socially embedded individual 
conception encounters is the problem of multiple selves. As a conception 
of the individual that is 'externally' based in social relationships, individu-
als' multiple selves can be understood to be their different social identities, 
or how they identify with others. As emphasized by Folbre (1994) and Sen 
(2006), however, our different social identities often conflict with one 
another, and this invites us to ask what the unity of the self consists in, and 
indeed raises the question whether the socially embedded individual is a 
single being at all. The multiple-selves problem also arises in connection 
with the atomistic individual conception (e( Davis·, 2003, ch. 4), but that 
this conception is 'internally' based in the prívate tastes of individuals 
arguably makes the problem irresolvable (e( ibid.). In the case of the 
socially embedded individual conception, in contrast, it is reasonable to say 
that individuals have tiesto others and also act independently. The ques-
tion is how this can best be explained. 
How, then, does the individual with many social identities still count as 
a single individual? Extending the identity concept, we can say that indi-
viduals with many social identities are single individuals when they are 
shown to have personal identities consistent with their many social identi-
ties. Let us begin to explain this idea by making two points about the 
concept of social identity. First, defining the concept of social identity as 
the idea of individuals identifying with others, others may be understood 
either as (a) social groups, such as are characterized by shared language, 
ethnicity, religion, work etc., or as (b) simply other individuals, such as 
friends, family members, neighbors etc. Second, whether social identity 
takes the social group form or the other individuals' form, the idea of indi-
viduals identifying with others can be interpreted in two different ways 
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depending on who is responsible for the identification. Either (a) individu-
als themselves can identify with others, or (b) they can be identified with 
others by third parties. 
These two distinctions allow us to set forth four types of social iden-
tity: (1) individuals themselves identify with other individuals; (2) individ-
uals themselves identify with groups of individuals; (3) individuals are 
identified with other individuals by third parties; ( 4) individuals are iden-
tified with groups of individuals by third parties. These four types are 
shown in Figure 6.1. Examples of each are: (1) a person identifies with a 
sick friend; (2) an immigrant identifies with a native language group; (3) 
social service workers socially identify individuals according to their 
family dynamics; ( 4) statisticians socially identify individuals according to 
race and ethnicity. 
Given that we are operating with a conception of the individual as 
socially embedded, let us then explain an individual's personal identity 
within this social identity framework. Doing so is consistent with the 
socially embedded individual conception set out in the last section if we 
suppose that individuals and social structures are mutually influencing. It 
is also consistent with seeing socially embedded individuals as reflexive 
beings if we define the personal identity of socially embedded individu-
als as an ability to organize and balance their many social identities by 
Who 
determines 
individuals 
themselves 
third parties 
Identification with 
individuals groups 
( 1) sick friend (2) native language 
(3) social service workers (4) statisticians 
Figure 6.1 Types of social identity with examples 
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engaging in self-reftection regarding what their different social ties and 
social identities involve. We can see better what this involves by applying 
Figure 6.1. 
Consider the two cells in the first row where the difference is between 
individuals themselves identifying with other individuals or identifying 
with social groups. Here the ability of individuals to organize and balance 
their different social identities, understood as maintaining personal identi-
ties, is a matter of how they themselves balance these two kinds of con-
nections. For example, an immigrant may identify with a native language 
group (a social group identification), but put this aside to care for a sick 
friend (social identification with another individual), also from the same 
native language group, who does not maintain that social identity. Other 
combinations of course are also possible, and thus the point is that part of 
what is involved in individuals having personal identities is how they them-
selves organize these two types of social identity. 
Consider next the second row as contrasted with the first row. The second 
row explains the social identities of individuals as society sees them, rather 
than as individuals see them. As a structure- agent framework treats indi-
viduals and social structures as mutually inftuencing, the relationship 
between personal identity and social identity also needs to capture the 
inftuence society has on this understanding. That is, not only do individu-
als organize and balance their different kinds of social identities (plus the 
different social identities within each category) in creating personal iden-
tities for themselves, but they must also contend with how society sees these 
balances as well. 
For example, in cell (3) a family social worker may make judgments 
about family dynamics which family members must themselves appraise 
relative to their own social identifications with one another. Whether such 
judgments are accepted or rejected then involves individuals in balancing 
and organizing their personal identities in a way that goes beyond how they 
see these relations in the absence of third partí es. Or, in cell ( 4), social sta-
tisticians classify individuals as members of social groups, which individu-
als themselves appraise in judging their sense of their social group social 
identities, since what social statisticians say may or may not be relevant 
from the individual's perspective. Again, how individuals see their social 
identities is infiuenced by how others see them. 
The concept of personal identity used here is specific to the conception 
of individuals as socially embedded, and contrasts with personal identity 
concepts which ignore or de-emphasize sociality, and rather focus on indi-
viduals' psychological characteristics (e.g. Parfit, 1986). The concept here 
also specifically addresses the concerns of Folbre (1994) and Sen (2006), 
who recognize that our different social identities often confiict, raising the 
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question whether the socially embedded individual is a single being at all. 
Key to this understanding is the idea of reflexivity, or the idea that indi-
viduals can take a position towards themselves. That this individualizes 
them is due to the fact that individuals can only take themselves as subjects 
as objects. No one can truly adopt the subject perspective for other indi-
viduals. That behaving reflexively also gives a unity to the individual is due 
to the singularity of this perspective. Yet that personal identity understood 
in this way is framed in terms of individuals' social identities makes it 
appropriate for thinking of individuals as socially embedded. 
3. The problem of inequality 
Inequality is an important problem for those concerned with social rela-
tionships, and who see individuals as socially embedded. Further, equality 
is defended as a value by those who derive their normative ideals from 
socialjustice views. But if individuals are all unique in having different per-
sonal identities in virtue of there being different ways in which they each 
organize and balance all their different social identities, how should the 
ideal of equality apply to them? One view of equality inscribed in many 
nations' laws and constitutions and also in many international covenants 
and doctrines is that equality is a matter of individuals having equal rights 
to certain freedoms, such as religion, speech, political participation, cul-
tural commitments and other liberties generally regarded as civil rights. 
We might accordingly regard these freedoms as foundations for equality. 
But this understanding of equality only takes us so far toward realizing 
equality in that having equal civil rights is often compatible with consider-
able inequality when individuals are economically unequal. Unfortunately, 
expanding our understanding of equality to include economic equality, 
particularly as when understood as income inequality, encounters signi-
ficant conceptual problems. Complete and comprehensive measures of 
income inequality appear to be unavailable, so that what we are left with at 
best is a loose 'quasi-orderings' framework whose application is inherently 
problematic (Sen, 1997). 
Paced with these difficulties, Sen recommends asking what the appropri-
ate conceptual 'space' should be in which we investigate inequality, and sug-
gests that we 'concentrate on the individual's real opportunity to pursue her 
objectives' (ibid., p. 198). His reason is that it is not just income or the 
goods bought with income that determines how individuals stand relative 
to one another, but how individuals with their different personal charac-
teristics are able to make use of income and the goods it allows them to bu y. 
Focusing on 'the individual's real opportunity to pursue her objectives' cap-
tures this two-sided relation, and changes the 'space' in which we evaluate 
inequality. Following Aristotle, then, this 'space' can be understood to be 
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'the space of "functionings", the various things a person may value doing 
(or being)' (ibid., p. 199). The approach Sen then develops is the 'capabil-
ity approach', which represents individuals' real opportunities to pursue 
their different objectives either in terms of their realized functionings or in 
terms of the options or alternatives they possess, also understood as their 
capabilities. 
The capability approach thus makes a virtue out of the differences 
between people, and promises a new approach to the problem of explain-
ing inequality. Basically equality is a matter of individuals being equally 
able to pursue their real opportunities or capabilities. But what does this 
involve? Since any given individual has many capabilities, they might be 
more or less successful in their pursuit of their capabilities according to 
how many of them they are able to pursue. Individuals might then achieve 
equality in sorne respects - for example, being well housed, having good 
nutrition, and having adequate health care - but not achieve equality in 
other respects - for example, education. This problem has led to argu-
ments that there ought to be a list of basic or essential capabilities, all of 
which individuals should be able to achieve if equality is to be achieved 
(Nussbaum, 2003). Sen, however, believes there cannot be one single list of 
essential capabilities, because we cannot anticípate what capabilities people 
will wish to pursue in the future, beca use we cannot know what future indi-
viduals will understand about their world and wish to value, and because it 
would be a denial of democracy to determine a list for others (Sen, 2005). 
Nonetheless, there seems to be one basis on which equality might still be 
understood in the capability framework. lt is suggested by Sen in his 
Aristotelian rationale for making the 'space' in which we investigate 
inequality the real opportunities-capability space when he says we need to 
shift our focus to the 'various things a person may value doing' (Sen, 1997, 
p. 198). The idea that individuals are able to determine what they value is 
very close to the idea that they are able to reflexively evaluate themselves 
relative to their options. In order to determine what one values, one must 
ask how one's options fit into one's conception of oneself. This conception 
can of course be changing as one pursues various objectives and creates 
new ones. Indeed, there is an obvious dynamic involved in individuals pur-
suing the things they value doing over their lifetimes that is often framed in 
terms of the idea of personal development. 
How does this, then, link up with the idea of equality as a normative 
ideal? The previous section defined the personal identity of socially embed-
ded individuals in a reflexive way as individuals' ability to organize and 
balance their many social identities through engaging in a process of self-
reflection regarding what their different social ties and identities involve. 
Although Sen's emphasis on the 'various things a person may value doing' 
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is not immediately framed in terms of individuals' management of their 
different social identities, this latter emphasis is not inconsistent with his, 
and indeed Sen allows elsewhere that social identity plays a large role in life 
(Sen, 2006). Thus, if equality is to be determined in the space of capabil-
ities, and what capabilities individuals pursue is determined by individuals 
themselves, then equality is a matter of individuals being equally able to 
pursue their personal identities, as they see them. Of course this is a very 
general view of equality, and it is hardly clear on the surface what would be 
required to make this ideal a basis for concrete social economic policy. 
Nonetheless, support for seeing individuals as being able to pursue per-
sonal identities as a foundation for equality links up with other normative 
notions arguably also connected to equality. That is, it can be argued in 
terms of the reflexivity idea that pursuing a personal identity is tied to such 
normative values as freedom, having self-respect, and individual dignity 
(Davis, 2006). Equality as a normative ideal, then, gains in clarity and cred-
ibility as it is integrated with and interpreted in terms of other accepted 
normative ideals. 
4. New directions 
How will thinking about individuals in economics evolve in the future? 
There has been considerable change in the economics research frontier in 
recent decades, and all the new approaches that have emerged there in one 
way or another criticize the atomistic individual conception, and lend 
support for an understanding of individuals as socially embedded (Davis, 
forthcoming). In addition, it has long been argued in heterodox economic 
approaches that the atomistic individual conception does not stand up to 
critical evaluation, and that individuals are socially embedded. Thus it is 
worth asking what this apparent shift in thinking may entail, since in the 
postwar period economics has been strongly structured around the idea 
that individuals are essentially atomistic. 
Consider, then, one influential result on the economics research frontier, 
a recent laboratory experiment called the public goods game (Fehr and 
Gachter, 2000). The game/experiment is organized around individuals 
repeatedly contributing toa public good. In initial rounds of the game con-
tributions are high, but as the game proceeds sorne individuals free-ride on 
the contributions of others, ultimately leading most individuals to abandon 
their contributions, so that the public good is no longer provided. A varia-
tion of the game, however, allows individuals to punish free-riders at a cost 
to themselves, and this reduces free-ridership, and restores the public good. 
The conclusion that is drawn from this is that the way in which the game is 
played - with or without punishment - determines its outcome. Whether 
public goods are provided in real economies, it follows, is also determined 
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according to whether punishment of free-riders is possible. Put more gen-
erally, how interaction between individuals in economic life plays out is a 
matter of the kind of institutional structure in which they are embedded. 
The public goods game, of course, is a highly simplified experiment 
meant to illuminate one specific principie, namely, that institutional struc-
ture plays a role in determining economic behavior. In contrast, in real 
economies this kind of simplification tends to conceal rather than illumi-
nate the complex ways in which institutions, social networks, values, habits, 
inherited beliefs and expectations all interact to create the larger context in 
which we observe individual behavior. Thus the logical strategy behind the 
new research in economics that builds on experimental results and sees indi-
viduals as non-atomistic is to incorporate increasingly complex institu-
tional considerations into the analysis in an effort to incorporate the role 
complex social frameworks have in economic life. In effect, the goal is to 
begin to see the economy as a social economy, where this refers to the larger 
social space in which economic life occurs. 
Thinking about individuals in economics in the future, then, may require 
considerably more attention to social structure than has been the case in the 
past, so that what it means for individuals to be socially embedded will 
depend on a greater understanding of how individuals interact in different 
and overlapping ways across social-institutional contexts. This would 
almost certainly constitute an improvement in the understanding of indi-
vidual interaction in current economics built around atomistic individuals 
engaged at a distance with one another in markets. The argument of this 
chapter is that this path of development for economics would preserve the 
basic outlines of the socially embedded individual conception as set forth 
here that sees individuals as reflexive beings influenced by and influencing 
the social structures they occupy. 
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